Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive.
Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She co-authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She has served as a co-editor for AEJ:Microeconomics and on the editorial board for International Journal of Game Theory. She is the recipient of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant, two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team, placing 16th, and won the Masters Fencing World Championship for ages 50-59 in 2017.Curriculum vitae (PDF)
Informed Sources and the Role of Platforms for Facilitating Anticompetitive Communication
joint with David P. Byrne, Nicholas de Roos, and A. Rachel Grinberg
forthcoming in Cartels Diagnosed: New Insight on Collusion,
edited by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Cambridge University Press.
On The Misuse of Regressions of Price on the HHI in Merger Review
joint with Nathan Miller, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan, Martin Gaynor, Richard Gilbert, George Hay, Ginger Jin, Bruce Kobayashi, Francine Lafontaine, James Levinsohn, John Mayo, Aviv Nevo, Ariel Pakes, Nancy Rose, Daniel Rubinfeld, Steven Salop, Marius Schwartz, Katja Seim, Carl Shapiro, Howard Shelanski, David Sibley, Andrew Sweeting,
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 10(2), 248–259 (2022).
What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caughtjoint with Robert C. Marshall and Claudio Mezzetti in Competition Law and Economics: Developments, Policies and Enforcement Trends in the US and Korea, edited by Jay Pil Choi, Wonhyuk Lim, and Sang-Hyop Lee, Edward Elgar Publishing, Chapter 7, 125-144 (2020).
A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers
joint with Simon Loertscher and Tom Wilkening
Journal of Economic Literature 53(4), 857–897 (2015). Reprinted in Recent Developments in the Economics of Information, edited by Cristiano Antonelli, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 342, Chapter 29 (2018).
The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings
joint with Robert C. Marshall
published by MIT Press (2012).
John Asker, New York University, Concurrences 2, 2013
Don Klawiter, SheppardMullen, Competition Law International 9(1), April 2013
William E. Kovacic, George Washington University, The Antitrust Source, December 2012
John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University and University of Adelaide, Journal of Economic Literature 50, December 2012
Excerpt in European Financial Review, August/September 2012
Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion
joint with William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Steven P. Schulenberg
Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, edited by Barry E. Hawk (Juris Publishing, Inc.), Chapter 13, 271-285 (2007).
Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements
joint with William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Matthew E. Raiff
in Handbook of Procurement, edited by N. Dimitri, G. Piga and G. Spagnolo, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 15, 381-411 (2006). 5
“Vertical Integration with Incomplete Information”
joint with Simon Loertscher
working paper online appendix
“Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion”
joint with Elisabetta Iossa, Simon Loertscher, and Patrick Rey
“Efficient Consignment Auctions”
joint with Bing Liu and Simon Loertscher
“Incomplete-Information Models for Industrial Organization”
joint with Simon Loertscher
“Dynamics of Mergers among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement”
joint with Jun Zhou
“Opportunism and Nondiscrimination Clauses”
joint with Greg Shaffer
“Nondiscrimination Clauses in Vertical Contracts”
joint with Greg Shaffer. Duke/UNC Micro-Theory Working Paper #14